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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a jury conviction and judgment of Theft
by Receiving, a Second Degree Felony, and Theft by Deception,

a Class A Misdemeanor, in the Third Judicial District Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge, presiding.

MANNY GARCIA
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
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Attorney General
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

7HE STATE 0F UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent

PICHARD LOUIS SMITH,

Case No. 19103

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, RICHARD LOUIS SMITH, apneals from a
conviction and judgment of Theft by Receiving, a Second Degree
Felony, and Theft by Decention, a Class A Misdemeanor, in the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge,
presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, RICHARD LOUIS SMITH, was charged with
Thr,r
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tah

l!ece iv i ng, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of
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·de r\nn. §76-6-408
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(1953 as amended), and Theft by

Clciss A C.lisdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
I 1953 as amended).
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He was convicted as charged

and was sentenced to incarceration at the Utah

'"''rt fnr the indeterminate term as provided by law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of both convictions and
judgments rendered below and to have the

remanded to

the Third Judicial District Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about June 7, 1982, the residence of Steven
Page was burglarized.

Two rifles were among the property

listed as taken (T.5), as well as jewelry, money, and stereo
equipment (T.12)
On that same day Appellant went to the Pavmee and
Sportsman's Discount pawnshops and pawned a rifle at each place
using his pictured prison identification card to complete both
transactions.

The pawn shop operators testified that Appellant

made no efforts to disguise or distort his identity, signature,
or thumb print which were required for the transactions (T.30, T.591
At trial, Appellant testified that he was not aware the
rifles were stolen when he pawned them.

He said he received the

rifles from his nephew, Ron Peterson, the mornina he pawned them
(T.99).

Peterson testified that Appellant was aware that the

rifles were obtained in a burglary.

Peterson admitted partic-

ipating in the Page residence burglary, but denied taking the
guns (T.Supp.10).

He said Appellant took them.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDED RELEVANT EVIDENCE
OF THE EFFECT OF INCARCERATION ON APPELLANT'S
HEALTH, AND OF THE BELIEF APPELLANT HAD REGARDING
THE POWERS OF HIS PAROLE OFFICER, AS IT RELATED
TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF APPELLANT COMMITTING THE
OFFENSES CHARGED.
Appellant contends the trial judge erroneously excluded
evidence that was relevant and probative.

The standard for

admissibility of evidence is stated in Terry v. Zions Co-op
Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 322 (Utah 1979).
Relevant evidence is evidence that in some degree
advances the inquiry and thus has probable value and is prima
facie admissible.
Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (July 1971), in
effect during Appellant's trial, defines relevant evidence as
"evidence having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove
the existence of any material fact."
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence

(August 1983) which

"onld be in effect during Appellant's new trial, defines relevant
as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
probable or less probable than it would be without

act10n
t lie:'

"'-'

l

1cncc

R11le 402, Utah Rules of Evidence
1

1,,, 0nt

evidence is admissible ... "
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(August 1983) states

The judge did not let Appellant testify about the
detrimental and severe effects incarceration had previously had
on his health.

The Court also disallowed testimony about what

Appellant believed the powers of his parole officer were regarding
incarcerating him.

Both of these inquiries, had they been allowed,

would have served to disprove the elements of the offenses charged
insofar as Appellant's mens rea was concerned.
The Theft by Receiving statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408,
(1953 as amended) requires the element of knowledge or existence
of probability that the receiver knew the property was stolen.

The

possession of the property invokes a presumption which the prosecution may use to fulfill the knowledge requirement for the offense,
as provided for in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402,

(1953 as amended).

Appellant's evidence would have related to that element and should
have been allowed to rebutt a presumption.

The evidence helped

explain why Appellant would not knowingly be involved with stolen
property.
The proffered evidence was relevant because it would have
advanced the inquiry into Appellant's state of mind and would have
been probative as to his credibility and the likelihood that he
would have intentionally committed the offenses.
Appellant's testimony was that the prospect of incarcerath
was an overwhelming deterrance from intentional criminal behavior
his part.

He was on parole and feared that his parole officer woul

at any time detain him in jail for at least 15 days if he even
suspected Appellant was invoked in any criminal activity.
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Appellac

tered particularly severe emphysema and tuberculosis attacks

'{i1encver he had previously been jailed and the torment and
sickness incarceration caused him was a valid reason he had for
avoiding criminal activity.

The jury should have been allowed

to know about this aspect of Appellant's frame of mind and
point of reference.

His actions at the pawn shops were

consistent with an innocent mind.

The jury was deprived of

this relevant evidence which was consistent with Appellant's
innocent mind.

It also was probative of his mentality and

insightful regarding his credibility.
Appellant did not deny that he pawned what were, in fact,
stolen rifles.

The only question for the jury was whether

Appellant possessed the necessary knowledge and criminal intent
when he did so.

This evidence went to a material fact, was of

consequence, would have aided the jury, and was prima facie
admissible.
to Appellant.

Thus, the Court's ruling was erroneous and prejudicial
It severely curtailed his defense of lack of mens

rea.

The Court may exclude relevant evidence if the situation
•o warrants. This principle was codified in Rule 45, Utah Rules
of Evidence, which governed and which provided:
Except as in these rules otherwise provided,
the Judge may in his discretion exclude evidence
if he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its
cidl'.lission will (a) necessitate undue consumption
of time, or (b) create substantial danger of undue
or of confusing the issues or of misleading a jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully
surprise a party who has not had reasonable
opportunity to anticipate that such evidence
would be offered.

-s-

Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence

(Auqust 1983)

is

essentially the same in substance and differs only in that it
includes unfair prejudice and needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
The Court abused its discretion because none of the
factors mentioned were present.

The trial itself moved briskly

along and was completed sooner than expected.
not prejudicial.

The testimony was

It would have confused nothing, would not have

misled the jury, nor surprised anyone, nor was it cumulative.
It was revealing and an integral part of Appellant's defense.
The standard for the Court was that the probative value be
substantially outweighed by the risk of the presence of one
or more of the aforementioned factors.

The general principle

that the usefulness of the evidence be more than counterbalanced
by it's disadvantageous effects in confusing the issues before
the jury, or in creating an undue prejudice in excess of its
legitimate probative weight was not applicable here.
the evidence was relevant it was admissible.

Since

Relevance is not

always enough,

however,

so the question remains,

is it worth

what it costs?

Here it was worth a great deal to the Appellant,

had potential value to the jury, and it would have cost nothing.
As this court stated in Terry (Supra) :
It is generally conceded the trial court is
more competent, in the excercise of this
discretion, to judge the exigencies of a
particular case and, therefore, when
within normal limits, the discretion should not
be disturbed.
The general rule followed by this
court will not be reversed unless it is shnwn
that the discretion excercised there in i,as he en
abused. (605 P.2d 322)

I 1 int c0ntends that because none of the counter-balancing

c which
1

11,
'nt

move the Court to exclude relevant evidence

substantially outweight its probative value were
in this case,

the Court abused its discretion by

Ron Peterson, who admitted participation in the Page
r)l)r']lar',' but •.Oenied any involvement with the guns, testified
and adverse to Appellant.
account.

Buzz Palmer corroborated

In light of the adversity of Peterson's

basic fairness would have dictated that Appellant
the opportunity to present all of his evidence for jury
consideration.

COIJCLUSION
Ir. summary, Appellant respectfully submits that he was

ienied a fair trial through the erroneous exclusion of probative
Since his defense was grounded in the lack of mens rea
reguired for the offense, he was effectively denied the right to
The Court abused its discretion in excluding

rresent that defense.

r>"1dence since no counter-balancing factors calling for
1u_-,1 Jn

',,ere riresent.

Appellant respectfully moves this Court to reverse this
3n I

,,-,,

nrder a new trial wherein Appellant can present

dnd

Jefense to a jury.
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:;UBMITTED this

day of August, 1984.

-

:.!ANNY GARCIA
Attorney for Appellant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
of August, 1984.
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